eventually become a member of the EU without recognition by Serbia as another potential candidate for EU membership as well as five EU countries remains unanswered, with the issue of Cyprus serving as a negative example.
Kosovo has thus far been excluded from visa liberalisation for the region suggesting that Kosovo is being left behind in the EU integration process, and the continual negative headlines contribute to the impression that the EU might be losing its grip. For this reason, this paper provides an overview over the EU engagement, including the limitations due to the status issue. Since the setup of the EU engagement is based on the Ahtisaari Plan that has not been adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the mandates and tasks of EULEX, the EUSR and the ICR as well as the remaining presence of UNMIK will be presented briefly.
Finally, an outlook will be given on the potential role of the EU in the context of two pressing issues: a) the report on the "Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo" 3 presented by Dick Marty, Rapporteur on Legal Affairs and Human Rights for the Council of Europe (CoE) and adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE) in Resolution 1782 (2011) inviting EULEX to investigate the allegations; and b) the EU's role as a facilitator of direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina. This paper concludes that over the past months the pressure on the EU to deliver on Kosovo has risen substantially. EULEX will need to increase its efforts in investigating and prosecuting highlevel figures allegedly involved in organised crime and war crimes. Making use of the leverage of EU integration that it holds over Belgrade and Pristina, the EU needs to push for compromises in the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina that can eventually lead to a negotiated solution that will at least allow for a mutually accepted coexistence. After all, any agreement between Belgrade and Pristina on the future of Kosovo can The Plan envisaged internationally supervised independence for Kosovo with continued presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an EU rule of law mission to replace UNMIK, an EUSR to exercise direction over the EU mission, and an ICR with executive powers to oversee the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. The EUSR and the ICR were intended to be vested in the same person. However, the Ahtisaari Plan was not adopted by the UNSC. Final efforts for negotiating a status settlement by a Troika consisting of the EU, Russia and the USA failed due to the irreconcilable positions of Belgrade and Pristina: while Belgrade, with Russian support, refused to agree to any solution exceeding the autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia, Pristina, strongly supported by the Quint countries 6 , was unwilling to accept anything short of independence. Kosovo therefore unilaterally declared independence on 17 February 2008. In order to gain international support, the authorities in Pristina constitutionally bound themselves to the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. 7 Still, the fact that the Plan was not authorised by the UNSC was significant: a legal basis for an international presence as envisaged in the Plan was not given for countries that did not recognise Kosovo. The consequences for EULEX and the ICR/EUSR will be outlined below.
EULEX
In light of Kosovo's looming unilateral declaration of independence, the EU launched EULEX and appointed Peter Feith EUSR prior to the declaration, 8 This has led to two parallel legal realities on the ground for the sake of stability, which will be explained below. Moreover, it resulted in controversy over the chain of command of EULEX: deployed under the umbrella of UNMIK, EULEX is deployed under the overall authority of the UN; however, the Council of the European Union decision to deploy EULEX established the Political and Security Committee (PSC) under the responsibility of the Council as providing unified command 10 with the EUSR providing political guidance to the mission. 11 Despite a lack of clarity on the chain of command of EULEX, the EU was finally able to start its work and declare initial operational capability in December 2008.
EULEX consists of three components: justice (civil and criminal cases, including organised crime, corruption, interethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes and missing persons), police (including operational matters, border policing, crime and police administration) and customs. In recognition of the principle of local ownership, EULEX is designed to assist the local authorities in the establishment of rule of law through a focus on monitoring, mentoring and advising the local institutions (MMA approach). Nevertheless, EULEX has executive functions in the fields of crime and war crimes, fight against corruption, riot control, and it can reverse or annul operational decisions taken by locals. 12 The justice component, for example, consists of EULEX judges and prosecutors, who work closely and often in mixed teams with their Kosovar counterparts, in order to assist the local authorities to develop a justice system that is "free free from political interference and adhering to internationally at the same time retaining executive powers, especially in the fields of riot control or political interference. A success story of this approach has been the reintegration of Serb officers in the Kosovo Police (KP) after Kosovo's declaration of independence; however, KosovoSerbs do not serve under the chain of command of the police headquarters in Pristina but merely report to EULEX. 21 Overall, aside from the difficult political and legal realities on the ground, EULEX and the local justice system have been criticised inter alia for a lack of resources and qualified personnel, especially for prosecution and judicial proceedings, and a lack of coordination and cooperation, in particular between the police and prosecution, leading to a large backlog of cases, lacking penal action, and the loss of evidence. 22 
ICR/EUSR
According to the Ahtisaari Plan, the International Steering Group (ISG) 23 appoints the ICR after consultations with the EU, and "seek�s] United Nations Security Council endorsement of the appointment". 2 With support of the International Civilian Office (ICO) the mandate of the ICR is to serve as the final authority to ensure the implementation of the Plan, including "corrective measures to remedy, as necessary, any actions taken by the Kosovo authorities that the ICR deems to be a breach of this Settlement, or seriously undermine the rule of law, or to be otherwise inconsistent with the terms or spirit of this Settlement". 25 Moreover, EULEX has to consult the ICR in the appointment process of international judges and prosecutors, or in case the mission uses its executive powers. 26 Finally, the ICR is responsible for the coordination of the international presence in the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. 27 As envisaged in the Ahtisaari Plan, the ICR and the EUSR are supposed to be consolidated in the same person 28 with the EUSR being responsible to exercise direction over EULEX. 29 Since the Ahtisaari Plan was not adopted by the UNSC, the role of the ICR/EUSR has been controversial. As outlined above, the Kosovar institutions obligated themselves to implement the Plan, thereby accepting the authority of the ICR/EUSR. Thus, the ISG appointed Peter Feith, who had already been appointed EUSR, ICR. Since he lacks approval from the UNSC, however, the invitation from the Kosovar authorities serves as the sole legal basis for an ICR mandate -provided Kosovo's independence is recognised. Consequently, Serbs, supported by nonrecognising states, consider the presence of the ICR The nonrecognising member states of the EU only accepted Pieter Feith as the EUSR. The mandate of the EUSR concentrates on his advisory function for the Kosovo government, the coordination of EU activities in Kosovo, the insurance of consistency and cohesion of EU activities and political guidance to EULEX. 32 As a result, the EU and EULEX cannot cooperate with the ICO/ICR officially, while the ICO is cementing Kosovo's independence and supports Kosovo's preparations for EU integration. Nevertheless, EULEX has cooperated with the ICR at least in some instances, for example in the context of the appointment of international members proposed by EULEX to the Judiciary Council, or when the ICR has to consent to international judges and prosecutors selected by EULEX prior to their appointment. 33 This again reveals the selective perception within the two parallel legal realities, culminating in Peter Feith, who as ICR/EUSR was on the one hand supposed to be status neutral and on the other hand supposed to support Kosovo's independence and the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan.
In recognition of this contradictory position, the EU has been discussing the decoupling of the mandates of EUSR and ICR. After the expiration of Peter Feith's mandate as EUSR on 30 April 2011, the EU appointed Fernando Gentilini as temporary EUSR in Kosovo in order to "prepare for a strengthened and longterm EU presence in Kosovo" 3 . However, given the EU's division on Kosovo's status and the implications this division has for the understanding of the current situation as outlined above, compromise on the structure of a consistent future EU presence in Kosovo has yet to be found. While the step of decoupling the ICR from the EUSR has resolved the contradictory mandate of Peter Feith, the abovementioned issues of cooperation between EULEX and the ICR/ICO as well as controversies over statusneutral EU engagement and deployment of EULEX under Resolution 12/UNMIK remain.
UNMIK
A further component of the different legal realities on the ground is UNMIK. As mentioned above, for nonrecognising 30 36 It puts the EU in the position of being able to apply its principle of conditionality, with the overall goal of bringing Kosovowithout prejudice to its status -closer to fulfilling the criteria for signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).
In order to serve as an incentive, however, the perspective needs to be tangible. Today, all countries in the SAP have signed SAAs, with Kosovo being excluded. Kosovo is not only far from reaching European standards, the controversy about its status further hampers its progress and the question how Kosovo could someday join the EU as long as the Union remains divided on its status is yet to be answered.
Moreover, in contrast to its neighbouring countries which benefit from visafree travel to Schengen countries, the EU has not officially opened a visa dialogue with Kosovo, stating that Kosovo first had to implement a series of reforms, inter alia the signing of readmission agreements and their effective implementation, and the enhancement of the security of its borders and the issuance of its documents. 37 In contrast, the only precondition for the start of a visa dialogue for its neighbouring countries was the successful handling of readmissions, 38 0 Nonetheless, sending the signal that "'�s]trict but fair' �...] does not play a considerable role" 1 by raising the bar for reforms prior to starting a dialogue might seriously undermine the credibility of the incentive of European integration. In turn, a visa roadmap could provide a common agenda for cooperation between EULEX and Pristina and could serve as a strong incentive for implementing reforms, as it is a goal that all citizens embrace. Given the even greater reform demands for signing an SAA, a visa roadmap currently is the most tangible incentive.
Outlook
Three years after Kosovo's declaration of independence and the EU's acceptance of responsibility for Kosovo's future, the EU seems in over its head. As if institutionbuilding and the promotion of rule of law in the postconflict situation of a society with extensive clan structures was not difficult enough, the EU remains trapped between the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan and its statusneutral engagement. However, the EU is in a unique position to not only assert influence over Pristina but also over Belgrade and Tirana, due to their sole common goal: EU membership. 
All Eyes on EULEX
Organised crime in Kosovo has always been a major challenge for EULEX and it has repeatedly been reported that crime networks cut high into the Kosovar political and business elite. Allegations against members of the political elite in Kosovo have surfaced again with the report and resolution adopted in PACE on 25 January 2011. The report drafted by Marty identifies Thaçi as the "boss" 2 of the socalled Drenica Group, a criminal group that inter alia has allegedly been in control of the trade of heroin and other narcotics, responsible for assassinations, beatings, and detentions as well as the trafficking of organs extracted from prisoners during and after the war. Moreover, the report links further senior officials of Thaçis Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) to the Drenica Group, some of whom have already been subjects to investigations by UNMIK, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and EULEX. However, nobody was sentenced. The report partly draws back on and is in line with previous findings of several national intelligence services and NATO, which have never been published. 3 Although the report admits that investigations and prosecutions are extremely difficult due to intimidated witnesses and strong loyalty within the clan structures of criminal organisations in Kosovo, it also criticises a lack of political will in the international community and a lack of cooperation on behalf of the authorities in Kosovo and Albania. 5 Nonetheless, the resolution adopted by PACE invites EULEX to "persevere with its investigative work, without taking account of the offices held by possible suspects" 6 . Consequently, Belgrade has been trying to transfer the responsibility for an investigation to the UN, and EULEX has opened a preliminary investigation and called upon opened a preliminary investigation and called upon all relevant actors to present their evidence. 7 Thaçi, in contrast, çi, in contrast, i, in contrast, whose PDK won the controversial elections on 12 December 2010, has formed a new government under his leadership. He presents the report as a "fabricated slander" 8 against all Albanians and against Kosovo as an independent state.
Overall, dismantling the allegedly criminal structures in parts of Kosovo's political elite needs to be a top priority for EULEX, as this is an integral part of the mission. Moreover, increasingly dealing with war crimes committed not only by Serbian forces (which has already been widely acknowledged) but also by former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) can contribute to conveying a more balanced picture of what happened during the war -not in order to question the legitimacy of KosovoAlbanians' desire for independence from Serbia as readily stated by Albanians, but in order to begin establishing the truth as a basis for reconciliation and dialogue. The EU therefore needs to take a clear stance on a truthful coming to terms with the past, regardless of the fact that this is a sensitive issue in significant parts of the Kosovar society, as many former KLA members are considered war heroes. It has been doing so with Belgrade despite strong criticism in parts of the Serb society and it needs to apply the same principles to Kosovo regardless of the risk of further losing popularity. Just as the extradition of Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić to Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić to the ICTY has been expected from Belgrade on its path to EU integration, it should be expected from Pristina and Tirana to support EULEX's efforts. However, given the outstanding role However, given the outstanding role of the USA in Kosovo ever since the NATO intervention ending war in 1999, the EU will need full US support to make very clear that the only way to muchaspired EuroAtlantic integration is through the establishment of truth.
It can therefore only be hoped that the EU will end its "hesitancy to push �...] cases too far, for fear of destabilizing the political balance in Pristina." 9 EU member states need to find the political will to commit the necessary resources and political support to EULEX, in order to provide it with the means necessary to investigate at the highest political level, including the establishment of trust from witnesses and a secure witness protection programme that, if necessary, enables them to resettle to EU member states or even the USA. Moreover, the EU needs to use its leverage of EU integration over Albania to enhance its cooperation with the investigations. If, however, If, however, the allegations seep away again without serious investigations, the EU runs the risk of seriously undermining its efforts and credibility in Kosovo. 
The EU as a Mediator between Belgrade and Pristina
After the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law, 50 the EU was able to play a prominent role in influencing Belgrade to take a constructive approach. It used its influence over Belgrade to prevent a resolution calling for new status negotiations. Instead, Belgrade and the EU cosponsored a neutral resolution, which acknowledged the advisory opinion and welcomed a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina facilitated by the EU. this resolution gives rise to optimism that a negotiated solution between Belgrade and Pristina might be possible, the obstacles are still enormous. 52 The fact that Belgrade has not recognised any documents issued by the authorities in Pristina has prevented movement of goods and people from Kosovo via Serbia with inter alia economic consequences. Moreover, participation of both Pristina and Belgrade in meetings of regional organisations such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) has not been possible since Belgrade insists on Kosovar representation by UNMIK. The authorities in Pristina have not had access to cadastral records and civil registries as they have had in Belgrade. Finally, Kosovo has not been able to obtain its own country code for telecommunication while not allowing Serbian companies access to Kosovo's energy and telecommunications sector. So far, none of the above mentioned issues have been concluded with an agreement; however, both sides are optimistic that the first compromises will soon be found. 53 Despite their supposedly technical nature, many of the issues raised in the negotiations have political implications. For example, it is difficult for Belgrade to accept custom seals and customs documentation that include state symbols of Kosovo as it prejudges status. In turn, compromises found inter alia on car licence plates, telecommunications and energy will require acceptance from Pristina of a continued presence of Belgrade in Kosovo, and Pristina. Both governments are in rather weak positions at home: the Serbian government is facing elections in spring 2012 and will therefore avoid making concessions that can be interpreted as a de facto recognition. At the same time, the government is considered to be counting on Serbia gaining candidate status in the EU integration process in 2011 for re election. However, given that Serbia has met the main condition for candidate status with the arrest of Mladić, compromise ć, compromise , compromise compromise with the Kosovar government might have become less central to achieve this goal. The Kosovar government, in contrast, faces strong opposition against the dialogue with Belgrade that culminated in the violent protest against Stefanović's ć's 's s visit to Pristina. Especially the movement Vetëvendosje! (self determination), which has been the third strongest political faction in the Kosovar parliament since the elections in early 2011, strongly opposes the international presence in Kosovo and the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina. They consider the negotiations as merely serving Belgrade's interest of gaining candidate status with nothing to gain for Kosovo. 55 Given the difficult negotiation process and the need for compromise on both sides, it is all the more important that the EU finds a common approach to its role as facilitator. It needs to continue using its political leverage to set forth the process of rapprochement via dialogue about technical issues, and ensure that the parties do not terminate the talks early. Moreover, any negotiated solution will have to include a solution to the situation in the Serbdominated north of Kosovo, as the majority of the Serb population refuses to recognise the authorities in Pristina and turns to Belgrade. While different models for solving this problem -ranging from substantial autonomy of Serbdominated areas to the separation of Kosovo -have been discussed outside of political negotiations, 56 it will be up to the EU as well as the USA to make it very clear to Pristina that they will at least have to accept a certain influence of Belgrade over parts of Kosovo in order to find a compromise.
Any compromise found, from solutions for cooperation on the technical level up to a potential solution on how Belgrade and Pristina can cooperate on a level that enables both of them to join the EU, will fundamentally help the Union to deal with Kosovo, in its engagement on the ground as well as on the political level. For example, a technical compromise with regard to the situation of rule of law in the north of Kosovo could support EULEX inter alia by solving the procedural question of appointing judges. Should the negotiations even lead to a sustainable compromise on Kosovo, the EU would finally be able to overcome its division. After all, "�o]nce Kosovo and Serbia resolve the recognition issue between themselves �...] others will have to follow suit; whatever its own opposition to independence, no state could plausibly maintain that Kosovo is de jure part of Serbia once the latter has set aside its claims." 57 However, while resolving the recognition issue does not seem realistic in Ibid., p. 2.
the shortterm, the successful conclusion of the first technical compromises can establish trust between the negotiating parties as well as within their respective electorates.
Overall, while the neutral stance of the EU on the status issue can be considered important for the EU's role as facilitator, it will also need to find a way to successfully use its leverage: whereas the leverage of candidate status so far seems to be a valuable incentive for Belgrade, the impression in growing parts of the Kosovar population that Kosovo has not as much to gain from compromise as Serbia, might impair Pristina's willingness to compromise. Moreover, any compromise Pristina will have to accept will require also the support of the USA, considering its enormous influence as one of the main sponsors of Kosovar independence. Nonetheless, despite all obstacles mentioned, the facilitation of direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina seems like a unique opportunity for the EU to support both in making substantial progress, not only in the creation of regional stability by ending decades of conflict but also towards the EU, while at the same time enabling the EU to fully reunite on the Kosovo issue again.
Conclusion
As outlined above, the setup of the international engagement in Kosovo as envisaged in the Ahtisaari Plan was developed to implement independence, and the attempt to partially implement the provisions of the Plan in a statusneutral manner has resulted in the creation of parallel legal realities. As a result, supposedly technical decisions in Kosovo have become highly political ones, and slow progress as well as the EU's division over the status issue risk that incentives provided by the integration perspective for Kosovo lose credibility, especially if the Union leaves the impression that its conditionality approach is not 'strict but fair'.
The beginning of direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina facilitated by the EU has given rise to optimism. Yet, while both sides have considered the negotiations constructive, four rounds of talks have so far not had any concrete results, indicating that progress will take time. At this point it is therefore too early to tell if and to what extent the negotiations will be able to solve the recognition issue. Still, given the internal division of the EU and the lack of cohesion in its engagement in Kosovo, the EU needs to push for a compromise on Kosovo for its own sake. A compromise would not only be a chance to resolve the parallel legal realities on the ground, it could also help the EU to deal with Kosovo in the context of the SAP.
Moreover, regardless of running the risk of further losing popularity in Kosovo, the EU needs to fully investigate the allegations against Thaçi and his confidants. It is fundamental çi and his confidants. It is fundamental i and his confidants. It is fundamental that the EU receives full support from the USA and finds the political will and the means to thoroughly investigate, as the establishment of truth is a prerequisite for reconciliation and sustainable peace. However, in light of the growing opposition against international presence in Kosovo and the talks between Belgrade and Pristina, the EU should at the same time send a signal to the Kosovar population that they are not left behind in the EU integration process, in order not to risk losing its leverage over Pristina. For this reason, the EU should finally provide a visa roadmap for Kosovo -not in order to lower the requirements for visa liberalisation, but in order to provide Pristina with clear guidelines for reforms. A visa roadmap would not only make the authorities more accountable in cases of shortcomings and lacking effort in the reform process; it would also send the message to the Kosovars that they too have something to gain if they work for it.
Overall, the EU needs to finally develop a more coherent and credible strategy for Kosovo in order to exercise determined leadership and live up to the responsibility it has assumed. If there is an actor that, together with its partners, has the political means to assert influence over both parties, it is the EU with its membership perspective and SAP instruments. If, however, the EU fails to find a coherent approach and finally exercise determined leadership, it will run the risk of further losing its grip on Kosovo.
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beginning of the democratization process. As such, elections in the postsocialist transition countries received high attention by the international community, especially, the European Union and the OSCE. Free and fair elections have been part of the EU's political conditionality for the integration of SEE countries since the middle of the 1990s. They were explicitly spelled out as part of the EU's regional concept for SEE in 1997 aiming at stability and economic development. Starting from the late 1990s onwards, free and fair elections became a major EU criterion for advancing its relation with the region, which ultimately led to an integration perspective being offered at the EU Feira Summit in 2000.
The paper takes the case of Albania, a country that has been highly dependent on international support from 1991 onwards, starting its transition as the most isolated and the poorest country in SEE. It thus presents a crucial case in order to explore the absorption of international norms into the domestic system. Since the early 1990s, when Albania's transition process started, the country saw many changes in its political and economic system. The first years were rather rocky and marked by serious setbacks caused by a major state crisis after the collapse of the pyramid schemes in 1997 and the Kosovo crisis, which posed a serious risk to stability in the region and for Europe. Since then, many steps have been taken in bringing Albania closer to a democracy and market economy. Intriguing in the case of Albania is that even though we can observe considerable reform measures being taken towards the The conduct of free and fair elections is widely seen as a minimum criterion for democracy in the transition literature. The election of a democratic government provides the first step in the dissolution of the old autocratic regime and the
